I. INTRODUCTION
T HE private information retrieval (PIR) problem is motivated by the desire to protect the privacy of a user against data providers. Besides its direct applications in data privacy, it is intimately related to many fundamental problems in cryptography, e.g., oblivious transfer [1] , instance hiding [2] - [4] , secure multiparty computation [5] , and secret sharing schemes [6] , [7] . The significance of PIR also extends beyond security, through its fundamental connections to other prominent topics such as locally decodable codes [8] and batch codes [9] in coding theory, relationships between communication and computation [10] in complexity theory, and most recently blind interference alignment [11] in wireless communications. In fact most constructions of locally decodable codes are translated directly from PIR schemes. Through the connections between locally decodable and locally recoverable codes [12] , PIR also connects to distributed data storage repair [13] and index coding [14] , which in turn encompass all of network coding [15] . Therefore PIR represents an important focal point to tackle significant challenges across these fields.
The goal of PIR is to find the most efficient way for a user to retrieve a desired message from a set of N distributed databases, each of which stores all K messages, without revealing anything (in the information theoretic sense) 1 about which message is being retrieved, to any individual database. The PIR problem was initially studied in the setting where each message is one bit long [8] , [19] - [23] , where the cost of a PIR scheme is measured by the total amount of communication between the user and the databases, i.e., the sum of communications from the user to the databases (upload) and from the databases to the user (download). What is pursued in this work is the traditional Shannon theoretic formulation, where message size is allowed to be arbitrarily large, and therefore the upload cost is negligible compared to the download cost [20] , [24] . The information theoretic capacity of PIR is the maximum number of bits of desired information that can be privately retrieved per bit of downloaded information. Equivalently, it is the reciprocal of the minimum possible download cost per bit of desired message. In [25] , we showed that the information theoretic capacity of PIR, for arbitrary number of messages K and arbitrary number of databases N is 1 + 1/N + 1/N 2 + · · · + 1/N K −1 −1 . There are several interesting extensions of PIR that explore its limitations under additional constraints. These include extensions where up to T of the N databases may collude [26] , [27] (T -private PIR); where some of the databases may not respond [28] (Robust PIR); where both the privacy of the user and the databases must be protected [1] (Symmetric PIR); where only one database holds all the messages and all other databases hold independent information [29] ; where retrieval operations are unsynchronized [30] ; and where beyond communications, computation is also a concern [31] . There is also much recent work in the distributed storage setting [24] , [32] - [34] (the databases form a distributed storage system) where the main focus is on how the coding of the storage system works jointly with PIR.
In this work, we mainly consider T -private PIR in the Shannon theoretic setting, where we have an arbitrary number of messages (K ), arbitrary number of databases (N), each database stores all the messages, the messages are allowed to be arbitrarily large, and the privacy of the desired message index must be guaranteed even if any T of the N databases collude. The main contribution of this work is to show that the information theoretic capacity of T -private PIR is 1 + T /N + T 2 /N 2 + · · · + T K −1 /N K −1 −1 . We further consider the extension to robust T -private PIR, where we have M ≥ N databases, out of which any M − N databases may not respond, so that with answers from any N databases, we need to ensure both privacy and correctness. In this context, the contribution of this work is to show that the information theoretic capacity of robust T -private PIR remains the same as that of T -private PIR, i.e., there is no capacity cost from not knowing in advance which N databases will respond.
Notation: For n 1 , n 2 ∈ Z, n 1 ≤ n 2 , define the notation [n 1 : 
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT

A. T -Private PIR
There are N databases. Each database stores all the messages
K ] subject to T -privacy, i.e., without revealing anything about the message identity, k, to any colluding susbset of up to T out of the N databases. To retrieve W k privately, the user generates N queries Q
N , where the superscript denotes the desired message index. Since the queries are generated with no knowledge of the realizations of the messages, the queries must be independent of the messages,
The user sends query Q [k] n to the n-th database, ∀n ∈ [1 : N]. Upon receiving Q [k] n , the n-th database generates an answering string A [k] n , which is a deterministic function of Q [k] n and the data stored (i.e., all messages
Each database returns to the user its answer A
N , the user can decode the desired message W k ,
To satisfy the privacy constraint that any T colluding databases learn nothing about the desired message index k information theoretically, information available to any T databases (queries, answers and the stored messages) must be independent of k. Let T be a subset of [1 : N] and its cardinality be denoted by |T |. Q [k] T represents the subset {Q
T is defined similarly. To satisfy the T -privacy requirement we must have
To underscore that any set of T or fewer answering strings is independent of the desired message index, we may suppress the superscript and write A T directly instead of A [k] T , and express the elements of such a set as A n instead of A [k] n . The metric that we study in this paper is the PIR rate, 2 which characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit. Note that the PIR rate is the reciprocal of download cost. The rate R of a PIR scheme is defined as follows.
where D is the expected value of the total number of bits downloaded by the user from all the databases. The capacity, C, is the supremum of R over all PIR schemes.
B. Robust T -Private PIR
The robust T -private PIR problem is defined similar to the T -private PIR problem. The only difference is that instead of N databases, we have M ≥ N databases, and the correctness condition needs to be satisfied when the user collects any N out of the M answering strings.
III. MAIN RESULT: CAPACITY OF ROBUST T -PRIVATE PIR
The following theorem states the main result. Theorem 1: For T -private PIR with K messages and N databases, the capacity is
The capacity of PIR with T colluding databases generalizes the case without T -privacy constraints, where T = 1 [25] . The capacity is a strictly decreasing function of T . When T = N, the capacity is 1/K , meaning that the user has to download all K messages to be private, as in this case, the colluding databases are as strong as the user. Similar to the T = 1 case, the capacity is strictly decreasing in the number of messages, K , and strictly increasing in the number of databases, N. When the number of messages approaches infinity, the capacity approaches 1 − T /N, and when the number of databases approaches infinity (T remains constant), the capacity approaches 1. Finally, note that since the download cost is the reciprocal of the rate, the capacity characterization in Theorem 1 equivalently characterizes the optimal download cost per message bit for T -private PIR as
bits. Note that when N = T , the capacity expression can be equivalently expressed as
The capacity-achieving scheme that we construct for T -private PIR, generalizes easily to incorporate robustness constraints. As a consequence, we are also able to characterize the capacity of robust T -private PIR. This result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The capacity of robust T -private PIR is
Since the capacity expressions are the same, we note that there is no capacity penalty from not knowing in advance which N databases will respond. Even though this uncertainty increases as M increases, capacity is not a function of M. However, we note that the communication complexity of our capacity achieving scheme does increase with M.
Remark: The capacity results in both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 extend to the -error case. Please refer to the Appendix for details.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 AND THEOREM 2: ACHIEVABILITY The achievability of the two theorems follows along similar lines, so we present the proofs together in this section.
There are two key aspects of the achievable scheme -1) the query structure, and 2) the specialization of the query structure to ensure T -privacy and correctness. While the query structure is different from the T = 1 setting of [25] , it draws upon the iterative application of the same three principles that were identified in [25] . These principles are listed below.
( To illustrate how these ideas work together in an iterative fashion, we will present a few simple examples corresponding to small values of K , M, N and T , and then generalize it to arbitrary K , M, N and T . Let us begin with a lemma.
Lemma 1:
be K random matrices, drawn independently and uniformly from all α × α full-rank matrices over (10) is identically distributed (recall that the notation X ∼ Y means that X and Y are identically distributed) to the right hand side of (10) . Because the rank of a matrix does not depend on the ordering of the rows, we have
Since S i are picked uniformly from all full-rank matrices, conditioned on any feasible value of the remaining rows In the following, we present 3 examples. In the first two examples, all databases respond, while the last example is on the robust setting.
A. K = 2 Messages, M = N = 3 Databases, T = 2 Colluding Databases
The capacity for this setting, is C = 1 + 2 3
1) Query Structure:
We begin by constructing a query structure, which will then be specialized to achieve correctness and privacy. Without loss of generality, let [a k ] denote the symbols of the desired message, and [b k ] the symbols of the undesired message.
We start by requesting the first T K −1 = 2 symbols from each of the first T = 2 databases: a 1 , a 2 from DB1, and a 3 , a 4 from DB2. Applying database symmetry, we simultaneously request a 5 , a 6 from DB3. Next, we enforce message symmetry, by including queries for b 1 , · · · , b 6 as the counterparts for a 1 , · · · , a 6 . Now consider the first T = 2 databases, i.e., DB1 and DB2, which can potentially collude with each other. Unknown to these databases the user has acquired two symbols of external side information, b 5 , b 6 , comprised of undesired message symbols received from DB3. Splitting the two symbols of external side information among DB1 and DB2 allows the user one symbol of side information for each of DB1 and DB2 that it can exploit to retrieve new desired information symbols. In our construction of the query structure, we will assign new labels (subscripts) to the external side information exploited within each database, e.g., b 7 for DB1 and b 8 for DB2, with the understanding that eventually when the dependencies within the structure are specialized, b 7 , b 8 will turn out to be functions of previously acquired side information. Using its assigned side information, each DB acquires a new symbol of desired message, so that DB1 requests a 7 + b 7 and DB2 requests a 8 + b 8 . Finally, enforcing symmetry across databases, DB3 requests a 9 + b 9 . At this point, the construction is symmetric across databases, the query to any database is symmetric in itself across messages, and the amount of side information exploited within any T colluding databases equals the amount of side information available external to those T databases. So the skeleton of the query structure is complete. Note that if DB1 and DB2 collude, then the external side information is b 5 , b 6 , so we would like the side information that is exploited by DB1 and DB2, i.e., b 7 , b 8 to be functions of the external side information that is available, i.e., b 5 , b 6 . However, since any T = 2 databases can collude, it is also possible that DB1 and DB3 collude instead, in which case we would like b 7 , b 9 to be functions of side information that is external to DB1 and DB3, i.e., b 3 , b 4 . Similarly, if DB2 and DB3 collude, then we would like b 8 , b 9 to be functions of b 1 , b 2 . How to achieve such dependencies in a manner that preserves privacy and ensures correctness is the remaining challenge. Intuitively, the key is to make 6 in a generic sense. In other words, we will achieve the desired functional dependencies by viewing b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b 9 as the outputs of a (9, 6) MDS code, so that any 3 of these b k are functions of the remaining 6. The details of this specialization are described next.
2) Specialization to Ensure Correctness and Privacy: Let each message consist of N K = 9 symbols from a sufficiently large 3 finite field F q (i.e., L = 9). The messages W 1 , W 2 ∈ F 9×1 q are then represented as 9 × 1 vectors over F q . Let S 1 , S 2 ∈ F 9×9 q represent random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all 9 × 9 full-rank matrices over F q . Without loss of generality, let us assume that W 1 is the desired message. Define the 9 × 1 vectors a [1:9] ∈ F 9×1 q and b [1:9] ∈ F 9×1 q , as follows a [1:9] 
where S 2 [(1 : 6), :] is a 6 × 9 matrix comprised of the first 6 rows of S 2 . MDS 9×6 is the generator matrix of a (9, 6) MDS code (e.g., a Reed Solomon code). The generator matrix does not need to be random, i.e., it may be globally known. Note that because of the MDS property, any 6 rows of MDS 9×6 form a 6 × 6 invertible matrix. Therefore, from any 6 elements of b [1:9] , all 9 elements of b [1:9] can be recovered. For example,
The queries from each database are constructed according to the structure described earlier.
Correctness is easy to see, because the user recovers b [1:6] explicitly, from which it can recover all b [1:9] , thereby allowing it to recover all of a [1:9] . Let us see why privacy holds. The queries for any T = 2 colluding databases are comprised of 6 variables from a [1:9] and 6 variables from b [1:9] . Let the indices of these variables be denoted by the 6 × 1 vectors I a , I b ∈ N 6×1 , respectively, so that,
where (14) follows from Lemma 1 because MDS 9×6 [I b , :] is an invertible 6×6 matrix. Therefore, the random map from W 1 to a I a variables is i.i.d. as the random map from W 2 to b I b , and privacy is guaranteed. Note that since 9 desired symbols are recovered from a total of 15 downloaded symbols, the rate achieved by this scheme is 9/15 = 3/5, which matches the capacity for this setting. While this specialization suffices for our purpose (it achieves capacity), we note that further simplifications of the scheme are possible, which allow it to operate over smaller fields and with lower upload cost. Such an example is provided in the conclusion section of this paper.
B. K = 3 Messages, M = N = 3 Databases, T = 2 Colluding Databases
The capacity for this setting, is C = 1 + a 2 , a 3 , a 4 a 5 , a 6 , a 7 , a 8 a 9 , a 10 , a 11 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 a 5 , a 6 , a 7 , a 8 a 9 , a 10 , a 11 , Starting with T K −1 = 4 symbols each requested from the first T = 2 databases, we proceed through iterative steps (1) and (2) to enforce symmetries across databases and messages. In step (3) we consider the first T = 2 databases together (DB1 and DB2) and account for the external side information, which in this case contains 4 symbols from (2) to enforce symmetries across databases and messages, we end up with new downloads that contain only undesired information symbols, which can now be used to download new desired information symbols. Once again, we consider DB1 and DB2 together, and account for the new external side information, b 23 + c 23 , b 24 + c 24 . Thus the external side information is comprised of two symbols, each of which is a sum of the form b k + c k . Dividing the side information evenly among databases DB1 and DB2, each is assigned one side information symbol of the form b k + c k with new labels. Thus, a 25 + b 25 + c 25 is added to the query from DB1, and a 26 + b 26 + c 26 is added to the query from DB2. Finally, applying symmetry across databases, we include a 27 +b 27 +c 27 to the query from DB3. At this point, all symmetries are satisfied, all external and exploited side information amounts are balanced, and therefore, the query structure is complete.
2) Specialization: Let each message consist of N K = 27 symbols from a sufficiently large finite field F q (i.e., L = 27).
q represent random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all 27 × 27 full-rank matrices over F q . Without loss of generality, let us assume that W 1 is the desired message. Define 27 × 1 vectors a [1:27] , b [1:27] , c [1:27] (20) so that all 9 elements of the vector b [19:27] + c [19:27] can be recovered from any 6 of its elements, e.g., from b [19:24] + c [19:24] one can also recover b 25 Correctness is straightforward. Let us see why T -privacy holds. The queries for any T = 2 colluding databases are comprised of 18 variables from a [1:27] , 12 variables from b [1:18] , 6 variables from b [19:27] , 12 variables from c [1:18] and 6 variables from c [19:27] . Let the indices of these variables be denoted by the vectors 12 ∈ N 12×1 and I c, 6 ∈ N 6×1 , respectively, so that, Thus privacy is guaranteed. Finally, note that since 27 desired symbols are recovered from a total of 57 downloaded symbols, the rate achieved by this scheme is 27/57 = 9/19, which matches the capacity for this setting.
C. K = 2 Messages, M = 3 Databases, N = 2 Responding Databases, T = 1 Colluding Database
The capacity for this setting, is C = 1 + 
We start by requesting the first T K −1 = 1 symbol from the first T = 1 database, i.e., a 1 from DB1. Applying database symmetry, we simultaneously request a 2 from DB2 and a 3 from DB3. Next, we enforce message symmetry, by including queries for b 1 , b 2 , b 3 as the counterparts for a 1 , a 2 , a 3 . Note that only N = 2 databases may respond. As a result, from the perspective of any individual database, we have only one symbol of external side information (from the other surviving database). We then exploit this side information symbol to retrieve a new desired symbol, i.e., we download a 4 + b 4 from DB1, a 5 + b 5 from DB2 and a 6 + b 6 from DB3. The construction is complete.
We want to ensure that no matter which 2 databases respond, we can gather enough desired symbols to decode the desired message and privacy is preserved to each individual database. These are guaranteed by the following specialization.
2) Specialization to Ensure Correctness and Privacy: Let each message consist of N K = 4 symbols from a sufficiently large field (i.e., L = 4). (28) Correctness is easy to see, because after receiving answers from any N = 2 databases, the user recovers all b [1:6] (refer to (27) ). Then the user subtracts out b [1:6] to recover 4 symbols in a [1:6] , from which all a [1:6] are recovered (refer to (26) ). The query for any individual database is comprised of 2 variables from a [1:6] and 2 variables from b [1:6] . Let the indices of these variables be denoted by the 2 × 1 vectors I a , I b ∈ N 2×1 , respectively, so that,
where (29) follows from Lemma 1. Therefore, the random map from W 1 to a I a variables is i.i.d. as the random map from W 2 to b I b , and privacy is guaranteed. Note that since 4 desired symbols are recovered from a total of 6 downloaded symbols (from N = 2 responding databases), the rate achieved by this scheme is 4/6 = 2/3, which matches the capacity for this setting.
D. Arbitrary Number of Messages K , Arbitrary Number of Databases M, Arbitrary Number of Responding Databases N, Arbitrary Number of Colluding Databases T 1) Query Structure:
For arbitrary K , M, N, T , we follow the same iterative procedure, briefly summarized below. 4 • Step 1: Initialization. Download T K −1 desired symbols each from the first T databases. • Step 2: Invoke symmetry across databases to determine corresponding downloads from DB T + 1 to DB M. • Step 3: Invoke symmetry of messages to determine additional downloaded equations (comprised only of undesired symbols) from each database. • Step 4: Consider the first T databases together. Divide the new external side information generated in the previous step (note that as M − N databases may not respond, side information is counted from N − T other databases) evenly among the first T databases to determine the side information budget per database. For each side information symbol allocated to a database create an additional query of the same form as the assigned side information (with new labels) combined with a new desired symbol. • Step 5: Go back to Step 2 and run Step 2 to Step 4 a total of (K − 1) times.
2) Specialization:
We now map the message symbols to the symbols in the query structure. Let each message consist of N K symbols from a sufficiently large finite field
represent random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all N K × N K fullrank matrices over F q . Suppose W l , l ∈ [1 : K ], is the desired message.
Consider any undesired message index k ∈ [1 : K ]/{l}, and all distinct = 2 K −2 subsets of [1 : K ] that contain k and do not contain l. Assign distinct labels to each subset, e.g., 
Now consider the desired message index l, and all dis-
Define the 4 To be more specific, database symmetry refers to the property that each database downloads a equal number of instances for each type of sums, and message symmetry refers to the property that within each database, the symbols from each message are equivalent up to permutations. A more detailed treatment can be found in [25] . We initialize by downloading T K −1 symbols such that in Step 4 when we divide side information symbols, each database always obtains an integer number of side information symbols. 5 The choice of α i is to ensure both correctness and privacy. Specifically, it guarantees that over each layer, (1) sufficiently many undesired symbols are exposed to decode the remaining undesired symbols that interfere with the desired symbols, and (2) the number of symbols seen by any colluding set of databases matches the MDS code dimension such that they appear uniformly random. The proof appears later. For example, consider the setting in Section IV-B, where the desired message index l = 1. Consider the undesired message index k = 2. Here = 2, i.e., K 1 = {2}, K 2 = {2, 3}, α 1 = 12 and
where the length of x
For each non-empty subset K ⊂ [1 : K ] generate the query
Distribute the elements of the query vector evenly among the M databases. This completes the specialized construction of the queries. The construction has K layers. Over the j -th layer, for each database, there are (N − T ) j −1 T K − j K j equations 6 that are comprised of sums of j symbols, out of which
involve desired data symbols. Suppose the user collects answering strings from any N databases. For each set K i , from N databases, we download
], from which we can recover the interference x 
]. Note that these α i variables are generated by the generator matrix of a ( M T α i , α i ) MDS code, so that they have full rank. Let the indices of the appeared variables be denoted by the vectors
Thus privacy is guaranteed. Finally, we compute the ratio of the number of desired symbols to the number of total downloaded symbols (from N responding databases),
6 Over the j-th layer, the downloads are in the form of sums of j symbols, each from one distinct message. The term (N − T ) j −1 T K − j comes from the side information exploitation step (Step 4) and can be verified recursively. A detailed analysis in similar flavor can be found in [25] .
Thus, the PIR rate achieved by the scheme always matches the capacity.
Remark: When we set T = 1, M = N, Theorem 1 recovers the PIR capacity result in [25] . The two schemes achieve the same rate (capacity achieving), but the two differ in that although the query structures are the same, the specialization here uses MDS codes over a large field while the specialization in [25] uses permutations over message bits.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1 AND THEOREM 2: CONVERSE
Clearly the capacity of robust T -private PIR cannot be larger than the capacity of T -private PIR. Therefore, we only need to prove the converse for T -private PIR.
For compact notation, let us define
We first state Han's inequality ( [35, Th. 17.6.1] ), which will be used later and is described here for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 3 (Han's Inequality, [35, Th. 17.6 
.1]:)
We next proceed to the converse proof. The proof of outer bound for Theorem 1 is based on an induction argument. To set up the induction, we will prove the outer bound for K = 1 (the trivial case) for arbitrary N, T , and then proceed to the case of arbitrary K .
where (43) follows from Han's inequality, and (44) is due to the property that dropping conditioning does not reduce entropy.
B. K ≥ 2 Messages, N Databases
where (50) is due to the fact that W 1 is a function of
, Q). In (54), the second term is due to the fact that the answers are deterministic functions of the messages and queries, and the messages are independent.
Consider (54) for all subsets of [1 : N] that have exactly T elements and average over all such subsets. We have
To proceed, we note that for the last term of (55), conditioning on W 1 , the setting reduces to a PIR problem with K − 1 messages and N databases. Thus, (55) sets up an induction argument, which claims that for the K messages setting,
We have proved the basis cases of K = 1 in (43). Suppose now the bound (56) holds for K − 1. Then plugging in (55), we have that the bound (56) holds for K . Since both the basis and the inductive step have been performed, by mathematical induction, we have proved that (56) holds for all K . The desired outer bound follows as
Thus, the proof of the outer bound is complete.
VI. CONCLUSION
We characterize the capacity of robust T -private PIR with arbitrary number of messages, arbitrary number of (responding) databases, and arbitrary privacy level. Let us conclude with a few observations. First, while in this paper we adopt the zero error framework, we note that our converse extends in a straightforward manner to the -error framework as well, where the probability of error is only required to approach zero as the message size approaches infinity. An outline of this extension is provided in the Appendix. Therefore, for robust T -private PIR, the -error capacity is the same as the zero error capacity. Second, recall that the capacity achieving scheme for PIR in our prior work [25] had a remarkable feature that if some of the messages were eliminated and the scheme projected onto a subset of messages, it remained capacity optimal for that subset of messages. The same phenomenon is observed for our achievable scheme for robust T -private PIR. On the other hand, an important point of distinction of the previous achievable scheme in [25] from the achievable scheme in this paper is that the former directly uses each available side information symbol individually, whereas here we need MDS coded side information (uncoded side information symbols do not suffice). This is because of the T -privacy constraint which simultaneously creates multiple perspectives of external side information depending upon which subset of databases decides to collude. Third, we note that in this paper we require perfect privacy (refer to (6) 
. Similar to theerror relaxation, we may relax this to a σ -privacy constraint, where the information leaked about the desired message index vanishes as the message size grows. That is, we could replace the privacy constraint (6) 
where σ approaches zero as the message size approaches infinity. It turns out that the capacity under σ -privacy is the same as the capacity under perfect privacy. Our converse proof extends to this setting by noting that the σ -privacy constraint implies that for any two message indices k 1 , k 2 ∈ [1 : K ], the difference H (Q
T , W 1 , · · · , W K ) = σ , vanishes with the message size and all other steps remain unchanged.
Finally, we note that since we focus only on download cost, upload cost is not optimized in this work. However, even with T -privacy, significant optimizations of upload cost are possible through refinements of our achievable scheme. For example, the symbols may be grouped in a manner that randomizations are needed only within smaller groups, which may reduce the number of possible queries, and the size of the field of operations significantly. To illustrate this, consider the achievable scheme for K = 2, N = 3, T = 2 that was presented in Section IV-A, where each message is comprised of 9 symbols. We will operate over F 2 (note that previously we required the field size q to be larger than 9). Suppose we divide the 9 bits into 3 groups of 3 bits each, and label the groups so that A 1 represents the first three bits of W 1 , A 2 the next three and A 3 represents the last three bits from W 1 . Similarly, let B 1 , B 2 , B 3 represent three groups of three bits each from W 2 . Now, for any group of 3 bits, say X = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ), let X (1), X (2), X (3) represent three randomly chosen linearly independent elements from the set {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 1 + x 2 , x 1 + x 3 , x 2 + x 3 , x 1 + x 2 + x 3 }, i.e., selected uniformly among the choices that do not sum to zero in F 2 . This essentially means that X (1), X (2) may be freely chosen as any two distinct elements of the set and then X (3) is chosen uniformly from the 4 elements that are not X (1), X (2) or X (1) + X (2). The queries are constructed as follows. 2) ) within each group. Due to the grouping of symbols the upload cost is significantly reduced. Moreover, because of the grouping we are able to operate over a smaller field. Whereas the original scheme presented in Section IV-A uses (6, 9) MDS codes which do not exist over F 2 , the refined example presented above uses only a (2, 3) MDS code which does exist over F 2 . As illustrated by this example, optimizations of upload costs as well as symbol size remain interesting avenues for future work.
APPENDIX: -ERROR CAPACITY
In the -error framework, a rate R is said to be -error achievable if there exists a sequence of PIR schemes, indexed by the message size L, each of rate greater than or equal to R, for which the probability of error approaches 0 as L → ∞. For such a sequence of PIR schemes, from Fano's inequality, we have the following correctness condition (corresponding to (5) in the zero-error framework).
[Correctness]
where any function of L, say f (L), is said to be o(L) if lim L→∞ f (L)/L = 0. The supremum of -error achievable rates is called the -error capacity. We next show that the zero error capacity results in both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 hold under the -error framework.
Note that zero-error achievable schemes automatically satisfy -error criterion (58). Thus we are only left to prove that the converse proof extends to the -error setting. This follows from the simple observation that in the current zero-error converse proof, in (41) and (47), we can simply replace the zeroerror correctness condition (5) with the -error correctness condition (58) and all other steps follow in the same manner.
